

Distr.  
GENERAL

CES/SEM.41/16  
3 May 2000

ENGLISH ONLY

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**STATISTICAL COMMISSION and  
ECONOMIC COMMISSION  
FOR EUROPE**

**STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE  
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES  
(EUROSTAT)**

**CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN  
STATISTICIANS**

**INTERNATIONAL LABOUR  
ORGANIZATION**

**Joint ECE-EUROSTAT-ILO Seminar on  
Measurement of the Quality of Employment  
(Geneva, 3-5 May 2000)**

## **Topic 5**

### **Voice Representation Security: An Aspect of Decent Work**

Invited paper submitted by the International Labour Office\*<sup>1</sup>

#### **1. Introduction**

This paper considers an aspect of work and labour that is typically disregarded in conceptualizing and measuring labour force participation or 'quality of employment'. If one is interested in assessing the quality of working, then whether or not an individual has the potential for representation of his or her interests will be a critical determinant of that quality. Particularly if the person is "vulnerable" for some reason, such as a lack of education or marketable skills, or assurance of income support other than from the work in question, the lack of collective representation rights is likely to be a source of personal insecurity and thus low quality of involvement in work.

The paper considers indicators of voice representation that could be used to assess representation security, and in doing so presents two *draft* model questionnaires. The paper relates

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<sup>1</sup> Paper prepared by Guy Standing, Director, Socio-Economic Security Programme, International Labour Organisation, Geneva. This is a first draft, and should not be quoted without permission. Comments would be welcome. The questionnaires are being developed by the team working in the Programme.

to an ongoing ILO programme designed to assess the extent of socio-economic insecurity in various countries and parts of the world and to assess the type of policies and institutions that could enhance individual and collective security in the workplace and labour market.

## 2. Why Voice Matters

For much of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it would have been taken as unremarkable to claim that collective representation is essential for worker security and for assessing the quality of employment. Early in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, public opinion and even workers' opinion are less certain, and it is common to find open hostility to unions from those working outside standard full-time employment relations. There are many reasons for this loss of faith. This is not the place to consider them in any detail. Suffice it to state that the fundamental rationale for collective representation remains. If the ILO wishes to move into the 21<sup>st</sup> century to promote an agenda of "decent work", it is essential to reconsider what it is about collective voice representation that is valuable and valued by workers in the broadest sense of the term 'worker'.

It may seem odd to start a short statistics paper with such broad existential issues. The obvious reason for doing so is that the statistics we want depend on what it is we believe constitute representation security. The trouble is that any empirically minded social scientist who tried to do this prior exercise would surely be in a mess fairly quickly when it came to making use of the available statistics.

Let us start with basic ideas. The term chosen to define the objective is Voice Representation Security (VRS). The sense of Voice comes from Albert Hirschman, who contrasted it with Exit options. Someone must have the capacity and opportunity to express views about, and bargain over, work – how, when, where, and for how much. Of course, having a voice does not imply shouting, and it must mean more than merely being able to say "yes" to a boss. What counts is *effective* voice. In practice, that means that the agency for voice in the work process must be strong.

The idea of Representation is also complex. At its simplest, this means that an individual or group must have the effective right to be represented by a body that can bargain on their behalf. This raises the same problem of identifying what should be within the acceptable range of practical situations to count. Historically, we know representation has ranged from a couple of ragged-trouser activists standing on a packing case to a mafia-backed gang calling itself The Brotherhood.

The idea of Security, in this context, implies real protection in the sphere of work and the assurance of protection today, tomorrow and for as long as it is needed. The range issue raises its head promptly. Nobody can have total security, and most of us would not want it or like it if we had it. Complete security would breed passivity, irresponsibility, opportunism and recklessness. It would stunt human creativity and undermine our psychological capacity to respond to challenges and to shocks. Severe insecurity is frightening. We want *basic security*, or tolerable insecurity. In the context of work, this must mean that any external threat to our pursuit of our chosen occupation

must be modest and predictable. It must also mean that any consequences of the realization of a threat must be manageable.

All of these issues are the terrain of philosophers and psychologists. Very few economists, statisticians or industrial relations specialists go down to this muddy territory, preferring simple models and straightforward measures. But issues of what does constitute representation, security and Voice must be at the back of our mind when we come to measuring this aspect of decent work and “quality of employment”.

Moving from abstract principles, we can assert that VRS requires that an individual worker has access to a collective body that can and will represent his or her interests effectively. Presumably, this means that the body must be sufficiently *large* and sufficiently *independent* and sufficiently *competent* to do so. Such considerations are also likely to lead the statistically minded to throw up her hands in frustration. Let us just go for some priorities, remembering that the best can be the enemy of the better-than-nothing.

### 3. Measuring Voice Representation Security<sup>2</sup>

The predominant model in which VRS has been pursued has changed quite dramatically over the past century, in particular. Stemming from guilds in the middle-ages, *craft unions* emerged, and during the early decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century these co-existed with *industrial unions*. With the former, collective bargaining more usually took place with single employers or small groups of firms; with the latter, it was more often between sectoral unions and sectoral associations of employers. In the USA, in the wake of the violent struggles to establish trade unions, employers tended to adopt what has become known as *welfare capitalism*. This was a paternalist labour system in which efforts were made by firms and government authorities to introduce *company unions*. These were under the control of managements and employers. The subsequent struggle in the USA and elsewhere over types of union has coloured the development of VRS ever since. But particularly relevant in our context is that it means that any *unionization rate* statistic could reflect very different structures with very different bargaining and representation capabilities.

In the industrialized countries of western Europe, North America and Australasia, company unions long faded from prominence. Industrial unions tended to become the largest type. In the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, *public sector unions* emerged as a major distinct type of organization, and in some countries these became the mainstay of unionization. At the same time, often through amalgamation, large *general workers' unions* emerged, becoming powerful shapers of the strategic directions (of lack of them) taken by “labour movements”. In some countries, the locus of representation in terms of bargaining went downwards, being decentralised to the level of individual plants or work units, while in others it went upwards, being centralized at the sectoral (industry) level or at the national (all industry) level.

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<sup>2</sup> Those mainly interested in the statistical issues may wish to skip this section.

Overlaying these trends in the structure and character of union representation, there was the emergence of *tripartism*, a word that was to become a touchstone of one's political position. To believe in tripartism was almost to define oneself as social democratic. It meant acceptance of a mixed economy, Keynesian economics and some variant of the welfare state. Tripartism was seen as an instrument of macro-economic stabilization and regulation, as well as the primary means of enhancing *social solidarity*. Tea and biscuits or beer and sandwiches at the Prime Minister's residence were symbols that collectively bargained compromises were about to emerge from carefully worded consensual documents.

The character of the agreements and institutions that emerged varied from country to country, government to government. However, looking back to the zenith of tripartism, one can probably detect a pattern of VRS that took shape under this process, which might allow us to take an "either/or" approach to the statistical measurement of the existence of tripartism. Although some systems of tripartism were more formal than others, and some were more comprehensive in the issues covered, one can argue that the big difference is between countries where there is a tripartite mechanism and those where there is none.

In doing so, one should feel uncomfortable, because the issues to which any system gives priority defines the level and type of VRS. We fudge when we presume that the existence of a collective body implies a greater degree of security than otherwise, particularly when it comes to matters beyond money wages. A classic case was epitomized by Samuel Gompers, the man who forged the dominant trade union paradigm in the United States in the early decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. He pushed unionism away from broader forms of representation to "bread and butter" unionism. This had echoes in western Europe, particularly as the big battalions of general worker unions grew to defend the interests of manual "semi-skilled" and "unskilled" (sic) labour.

Although there were conflicting interests within national federations of unions, which were mirrored to some extent on the employers' side, macro-level VRS in that era was pursued by giving formal and substantive recognition to registered trades unions and registered employer organizations embedded in the state through formal tripartite bodies. In a society consisting of a large majority of the population being in similar work statuses and being in regular, stable, full-time wage labour, such an arrangement may be a reasonable proxy macro-level indicator of VRS. Key to the validity of that claim is the claim that the two sides must be representative of the *median worker* and *median employer*. If the respective bodies are representative and the structure is reasonably homogeneous, then it scarcely matters if 10% or 80% of the workforce or the employers are in their respective bodies.

Merely stating that proposition highlights just how sensitive representation is to the structure of work and the working population. It also reminds us that it is difficult to ensure that a collective body can and does represent the interests of those who do not conform to the norm or the median member. Paradoxically, strength in one area can lead to overall weakness. In a way, this is what happened in many countries in the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. To appreciate that, one should differentiate between *defensive VRS* and *progressive VRS*. In practical terms, unions can fight to

hold onto what they had achieved in the past, or they can fight for something new, which may mean giving up something from the past.

In the main, twentieth-century trade unions fought for the seven forms of labour security identified elsewhere, but gave priority at the macro-economic level to labour market security (some self-interested notion of Full Employment), and at the micro-economic level to labour-based income security, plus employment security (for their members) and work security (occupational health and safety at work). This statement could be contested, and it is stated because in reviewing the stylized developments the statistically minded should ask, “How could the orientation of VRS be measured?”

In any case, few observers would question the view that the dominant 20<sup>th</sup> century model of VRS was eroded fatally in the last quarter of the century. Mentioning the main factors may be useful in helping to define what we need to measure in order to monitor trends in VRS in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Along the way, the political and economic premises on which the desire for consensual bargaining and compromise were removed. Tripartism, under which the *forward march of labour* was supposedly organized, was actually dependent on governments’ and employers’ faith in Keynesian economics. It went together with “*incomes policy*”, which took various forms in different countries but which meant a regulatory attempt to control inflationary pressures associated with so-called Full Employment, which in turn was dependent on macro-economic demand-management policy. Once Keynesianism was rejected, as occurred in the 1970s, the basic rationale for tripartism was eroded. Where it persisted or re-emerged, the evidence suggests that its rationale and outcomes changed substantially. Although adherents to the tripartite flag would take exception to the claim, one can argue that it became mainly an institutional mechanism for organised *concession bargaining*, making concessions of some aspects of labour flexibility, for instance, in return for maintaining real wages or even just limiting their decline.

This changing function of tripartism also makes it hard to measure VRS at the macro-level by means of an indicator of its existence or otherwise. This leads to the question for the statistically-minded: Is such a proxy a better-than-nothing indicator? Does the mere existence of a tripartite body imply greater VRS than the absence of one? The provisional answer is that it is better than nothing. But this is stated without a great deal of confidence.

The next major factor eroding the 20<sup>th</sup> century model of VRS was the removal of the second premise of welfare state capitalism – the closed economy system. In the post-1945 era, unions were able to bargain with employers in the reasonable expectation that key parameters were given, including most crucially the fact that most competitors had similar non-wage labour costs and regulations with which to comply. Trade in competitive goods and services took place with countries that had similar structures and standards. But once most countries became open economy models, that premise disappeared.

How could we take account of this change in measuring VRS? Should we rely on some index of openness, such as the share of trade in GDP? Or should we think in terms of something slightly more sophisticated, such as the share of GDP consisting of trade with countries with lower levels of unionization? A drawback of the latter is that it is an *ex post* variable. It could be measuring the outcome of cost pressures rather than the existence of the pressures.<sup>3</sup> In any case, however it is measured, we may hypothesise that globalisation and open economies mean that conventional VRS is weakened in countries where it was relatively strong.

Another factor eroding old-style VRS has been the increasing heterogeneity of employment and work statuses in industrialized countries, and possibly elsewhere as well. This also applies to patterns of labour force participation. The changes have had two distinctive effects. One is that it makes trade union organization harder, which is well known. The other is less often recognized, which is that it makes *any given level of unionization less valid as a proxy indicator of VRS*. It does not measure the VRS of categories that are less unionized, and it does not take into account that, perhaps perversely, unionization may have a negative effect on the subjective perception of VRS of those not in unionized jobs (and possibly on the objective VRS as well). This is likely to apply particularly strongly if their interests are not represented by the existing trade unions or if they perceive that they are not taken into account. There have been numerous reports that something like this has happened. We will not take this any further at this stage, except to pose one question: As an indicator of VRS, should we think in terms of an adjusted unionization rate, such as  $(\%TU \times E/LF)$ , where E is the number of persons in regular (full-time?) employment, and LF is the total labour force?

In sum, assessing the contextual or historical developments can help in pointing to what type of indicators of VRS are needed. The remainder of this short paper focuses on the practical matter of identifying and gathering relevant statistical indicators.

#### 4. Statistical Indicators of VRS

As part of the ILO's Programme on Socio-Economic Security, we are developing statistical indicators of various types of security, described elsewhere.<sup>4</sup> It seems useful to consider each aspect or form of security in terms of three types of complementary indicator. *Input indicators* refer to regulations, laws, and formal commitments by the government; *process indicators* refer to the mechanisms and institutions that exist to protect or enhance particular forms of security; *outcome indicators* refer to statistics on the extent and pattern of insecurity.

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<sup>3</sup> For example, if the existence of unions leads to high labour costs, that could lower exports by more than it raises imports, so lowering the trade share of GDP. The elasticities differ. If one just took the import share, that could be high because VRS is low and not be a cause of the low VRS.

<sup>4</sup> ILO Infocus Programme on Socio-Economic Security, Medium Term Workplan (Geneva, ILO, October 1999; available on request). For a rationale, see G.Standing, Global Labour Flexibility: Seeking Distributive Justice (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999).

In practice, in some cases these overlap and in some cases it is somewhat arbitrary to allocate an indicator to one type rather than another. But the distinction helps in focusing attention on the need to capture the three dimensions of any form of security.

#### 5. National Indicators

Measuring ‘quality of employment’ and ‘decent work’ require both macro-level and micro-level indicators. In the case of VRS, the legal and regulatory framework, as well as the existence of collective bodies to which workers could belong, are the standard macro-level input or facilitating indicators. The input measures might include basic indicators such as whether or not the country has ratified well-established international freedom of association conventions, and whether or not there is a law allowing trade unions and making it easy for them to organize. They could also include measures of bargaining scope and freedom to bargain, freedom to strike, to picket and so on.

The following provisional questions come from the general SES questionnaire currently being piloted. The numbers and section refer to the position in the overall questionnaire, which has seven sections. Questions preceded by an asterisk (\*) are regarded as particularly experimental and subject to probable refinement. It is presumed that the person or institution filling out the ‘questionnaire’ is aware of the definitional issues, so that only occasional reminders of critical points are included.

At the national level, the primary *input* indicators stem from the laws and regulations of the country. This might include ratification of relevant Conventions of the International Labour Organisation and any that have been created as instruments of organizations such as the European Union. Laws on freedom of association are most relevant, including any regulations on type of union (whether or not there is a legal restriction on independent unions, as exists in some countries, such as Chile), and perhaps including a measure of the complexity and cost of recognition and registration. In the provisional list of indicators that we have opted to measure for our SES data bank, we have included the legal right to organize and the regulation on type of union permitted (F2a and F2b). One should add an indicator of the strength of the right to take industrial action, which is proxied by F12.

It is important to have an indicator of the types of union permitted under the law. ‘Permitted’ is ambiguous, since a country might allow all types of union formally but put such barriers in the way of one or more types that it steers the structure in a particular direction. Or there may be fiscal or other incentives for some type of union, and/or extra costs for others. We can start with the standard difference – *company unions* (or ‘in-house’) in contrast with *industrial and occupational unions*. If the law allows all types equally and without giving one or other type a legislative advantage, that is clearly a different situation from one in which company unions are exclusively allowed (as in Chile, for instance) or, conversely, one in which company unions are banned. This issue is covered in F2. One hypothesizes that VRS would be given greater regulatory support where independent industrial, craft and general unions were encouraged, while company unions were restricted.

Process and outcome variables are blurred. The starting point is membership of unions, but there are several conceptual and measurement difficulties. The ILO compiled statistics on unionisation for its World Labour Report of 1998, and other organizations and individuals have also made valuable attempts to collate the available data.<sup>5</sup> These show that there is still a long way to go before we can feel confident that the statistics are reliable. The problems start with the concept itself. It is typically defined abstractly as “the percentage of the population at risk who are members of recognized trade unions”. Defining a trade union is not easy. Should we include professional associations that do not bargain collectively on behalf of their members? Probably not. As for “recognition”, should this mean that the figures should include only unions registered or legitimized by government regulations or that are members of some national federation? Again, probably not.

Next it is not clear what membership should mean. In some countries, only those who have paid union dues are classifiable as members. In others, lapsed contributors are still kept as members. In some countries, such as Ukraine, large numbers of workers are reported to have been unable to pay union dues, because they have not received their wages. In some countries, union membership can continue for those who have retired. One problem is that most unions have a desire to inflate their membership figures because their bargaining and political status depend partly on their perceived size. This is one reason for recommending strongly that data should be collected via household or labour force surveys, not from trade union reports. Rather few countries in the world have sample survey data on union membership.<sup>6</sup> One should not presume that such data are conceptually or empirically reliable. One reason is that most surveys ask merely one or two questions. We will come back to this in our proposed individual-level questionnaire.

At the national level, all we need to recognize is that the source of information makes a big difference. Ideally, where more than one source exists, it would be desirable to obtain estimates for each of the types of source available – household, establishment, union registration, government estimate. Very few countries have more than one source available. What is attempted in F1a to F1c is a set of measures that would give comparable data over time and between countries. At present, the questions are framed to ask for unionisation rates. However, there is a good argument in favour of asking for membership totals, in absolute numbers. As it is, an attempt is taken to find out what proportion of union members are retired and what proportion are unemployed (F1d).

The following lists our draft national-level questionnaire, which covers the various macro-level indicators of VRS.

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<sup>5</sup> See, for example, B.Ebbinghaus and J.Visser, “When institutions matter: Union growth and decline in Western Europe, 1950-95”(Mannheim, 1998, mimeographed). An earlier valuable report was K.Walsh, Trade Union Membership: Methods and Measurement in the European Community (Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Community, 1985).

<sup>6</sup> Those that have them include Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the USA.



## F. Representation Security

F1. a, What is the recorded level of unionisation for the following years?\*

	<i>All</i>	<i>Males</i>	<i>Females</i>
1990 (or nearest year: _____):	_____	_____	_____
1995 (or nearest year: _____):	_____	_____	_____
2000 (or nearest year: _____):	_____	_____	_____

\* *Unionisation is defined as the number of recorded union members divided by the number of persons in paid employment, full-time and part-time. If not available for the exact year, provide closest year. If available, give figures for unionisation based on surveys of households or individuals. If not available, give figures as reported by trade unions, and if that is not available give figures based on some other source, indicating which source in F1b. Make sure that the type of source of data is the same in all years*

b, What type of data source was used to measure unionisation in the latest year specified?

1. Government estimate
2. Trade union reports
3. Sample survey of individuals
4. Other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)
5. Don't know

c. If second source of data exists, give the figures by that source as well:

	<i>All</i>	<i>Males</i>	<i>Females</i>
1990 (or nearest year: _____):	_____	_____	_____
1995 (or nearest year: _____):	_____	_____	_____
2000 (or nearest year: _____):	_____	_____	_____

Indicate source: 1 – Government estimate; 2 – Trade union estimate; 3 – Other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_) 4 – Don't know.

d. Approximately, what percent of union members are

■ retired/ pensioners \_\_\_\_\_

■ unemployed \_\_\_\_\_

F2a. Is there a law or set of regulations restricting the type of trade union allowed in the country?

1. Yes
2. No

b. What type of union, if any, is not allowed by the law?

1. Industrial unions; 2 – Craft unions; 3 – General unions; 4 -- Company unions; 5. Plant unions; 6. Other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

c, Which type of union accounts for the largest number of unionised workers?

1. Industrial unions
2. Craft, or occupational, unions
3. General unions
4. Company unions
5. Plant unions
6. Don't know

\*F3. For the largest union in the country how would it rank the following issues in terms of importance?

- |                            | <i>ranking</i> |
|----------------------------|----------------|
| • Right to organize        | _____          |
| • Right to strike          | _____          |
| • Other organisation issue | _____          |
| • Paid leave days          | _____          |
| • Maternity leave          | _____          |
| • Study leave              | _____          |

\*F4. For the three largest trade unions, how many of the top officials (e.g. president, vice-president, executive board) are female?

	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
1 <sup>st</sup> largest:	_____	_____
2 <sup>nd</sup> largest:	_____	_____
3 <sup>rd</sup> largest:	_____	_____

\*F5. What percent of unionised workers are in independent trade unions? \*

\_\_\_\_\_ %

\* *If only available for some sectors, give figure for those, specifying sectors covered. Independent refers to those that are not dependent on employers or set up by managements.*

F6. a, Approximately, how many trade unions exist in the country, including unaffiliated unions and sub-national unions?

\_\_\_\_\_

b, How many national trade unions are there in the country? (Indicate zero if none)

\_\_\_\_\_

c. What share of trade union members work for the public (government) sectors?

\_\_\_\_\_

F7. a, What percent of employees are covered by collective agreements?

\_\_\_\_\_ %

b, What is the main form of collective bargaining?

- Centralised, multi-sectoral
- Sectoral
- Occupational
- Company, plant
- Other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

F8. a, Besides trades unions, are there other non-governmental institutions to promote the interests of workers or workplace issues? \*

1. Yes      2. No

\* *These are other, complementary forms of worker representation that are not necessarily recognized as trade unions.*

b, If Yes, please describe those institutions in the following table:

Institution	Sector covered	Workers covered	Main concern

F9. a, Is there a national “tripartite” or similar board or council for labour policies or issues?

1. Yes      2. No

b, If Yes, what is the name of this body? (largest body if more than one)

\_\_\_\_\_

c, Describe the membership of this body (types of workers, etc.)

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

F10. How many days were lost in 1999 due to strikes and other such disputes?

(or latest year, specify: \_\_\_\_\_ )

Number of days lost: \_\_\_\_\_

F21. How many industrial disputes were there in 1999?

(or latest year, specify: \_\_\_\_\_ )

number of disputes: \_\_\_\_\_

F32. a, Are there any laws outlawing or restricting the right to strike?

1. Yes, outlawed

2. Yes, restrictions

3. No

b, If “Yes, restrictions” what are the restrictions?

- Sectors excluded
- Cooling off period required
- Arbitration required
- Other

} specify: \_\_\_\_\_

F13a. How many national federations of employers exist in the country?

\_\_\_\_\_

b. Approximately what percentage of total employment do those federations cover?

\_\_\_\_\_

F14. Has the Government ratified

- |                         |        |       |
|-------------------------|--------|-------|
| • ILO Convention No. 87 | 1. Yes | 2. No |
| • ILO Convention No.98  | 1. Yes | 2. No |
| • ILO Convention No.141 | 1. Yes | 2. No |

## 6. Establishment Indicators

There are various dimensions of VRS that are best monitored through establishment data. These will not be covered in this draft, although we have been following the same reasoning as for national indicators, i.e., identifying input, process and outcome indicators.

Data have been collected through *Enterprise Labour Flexibility and Security Surveys* (ELFS), which have been carried out in over 20 countries so far. The data refer to type of union, membership levels and trends, existence and scope of collective agreements and existence or otherwise of internal mechanisms in which the voice of workers is included.

7. Individual Indicators

Finally, the following questions are those we have drafted for what we are calling People's Security Surveys. The questionnaire presented here is the one designed with particular reference to Ukraine, where we are conducting such a survey during the course of the year 2000. The set of questions takes a different form in other countries, although the issues covered are similar.

The set of questions tries to look at the individual's *knowledge* of the means of obtaining VRS, subjective perceptions of their value, and actual behaviour, while gathering information on the institutional structure of representation. Note that we have included some questions on knowledge and membership of non-government organizations that purport to be alternatives or complements to traditional trade unions.

Many statisticians would be most concerned about the validity of attitudinal questions, such as Q2 and Q3. However, in this context such questions probe for relevant subjective indicators of a sense of security. As far as possible, precoded multiple responses are provided, since this is the standard procedure followed by social psychologists and sociologists.

<b><u>Voice Representation Security</u></b>			
<b>Q1. Do you belong to an organization representing worker interests in enterprises?</b>			
1. Yes	2. No		
<b>Q2. What is your general attitude toward trade unions -- mostly positive, mostly negative, or a mixed attitude?</b>			
1. Positive mostly	2. Negative mostly	3. Mixed opinion	4. Uncertain
<b>Q3. In your opinion, <u>at present</u> what type of trade union best represents worker interests?</b>			
1. National union	2. Regional union	3. Industrial/sectoral union	
4. Company union	5. Other (Specify: _____)		6. Don't know
<b>Q4. Approximately, what percentage of all workers in Ukraine would you say belong to a union? _____ 777 – Do not know</b>			
<b>Q5. Do you think the percentage is higher, lower, or about same as 5 years ago?</b>			
1. Higher now	2. Lower now	3. About same	4. Don't know
<b>Q6. Do you know of any organization besides trade unions that represent workers'</b>			

<b>interests?</b>
1. No    2. Yes → <b>Q6b.</b> Specify _____
<b>Q7. Do you know of any organization that represents the interests of self-employed?</b>
1. Yes            2. No (SKIP TO Q8)
<b>Q7b. Do you belong to any such organization?</b>
1. Yes            2. No
<b>Q8. Do you trust or not trust management to look after your welfare?</b>
1. Yes, fully    2. Yes, mostly    3. No, mostly    4. No, not at all    5. Don't know
<b>Q9. How secure do you feel that you will have a voice in the decisions which affect you at work?</b>
1. Yes, fully    2. Yes, mostly    3. No, mostly    4. No, not at all    5. Don't know

8. Concluding Thoughts

Identifying and measuring voice representation security as an integral part of “decent work” is still in its infancy. Based on preliminary findings, it is planned to hold several technical seminars with participation by statisticians as well as labour analysts. It is hoped that one of the outcomes will be a manual on methods of monitoring VRS, which will review the statistical techniques available. Meanwhile, comments and suggestions would be warmly welcomed and acknowledged.